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m THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,
Case No. 950714-CA
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Priority No.

f£

vs.
PAUL HERWIT,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PAUL HERWIT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Paul Herwit brings this appeal from a decision by the Third Circuit Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, granting appellee Bank One's motion for summary judgment. This
Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1992 & Supp.
1995).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue #1
Did the circuit court err in concluding that Bank One was a person entitled to enforce a
$9000 check presented to it for payment where genuine issues of material fact exist precluding the
possibility of Bank One enforcing the check as a holder in due course?

Issue #2
Did the circuit court err in concluding that Bank One was a person entitled to enforce the
check where appellant has raised several defenses negating Bank One's right to enforce it as a
mere holder of the instrument?

Standard of Review
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court must 'View the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
Higginsv. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,233 (Utah 1993). "Summary judgment is
appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, no
deference is due the trial court's determination of the issues presented. However, [this Court] may
affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not
relied on below." Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are determinative in this appeal:
Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-103 (Supp. 1995) (in part) (based on UCC
§ 3-103):
"Good faith" means honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.

Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-301 (Supp. 1995) (based on UCC § 3301):
"Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means the holder of the
instrument, a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the
rights of a holder, or a person not in possession of the instrument
who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 70A-3309 or Subsection 70A-3-418(4). A person may be a person
entitled to enforce the instrument even though he is not the owner
of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.

Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302(l) (Supp. 1995) (based on UCC § 3302):
(1) Subject to Subsection (3) and Subsection 70A-3-106(4), "holder
in due course" means the holder of an instrument if:
(a) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder
does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration
or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into
question its authenticity; and
(b) the holder took the instrument for value, in good faith,
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been
dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to
payment of another instrument issued as part of the same
series, without notice that the instrument contains an
3

unauthorized signature or has been altered, without notice of
any claim to the instrument described in Section 70A-3-306,
and without notice that any party has a defense or claim in
recoupment described in Subsection 70A-3-305(l).

Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-305 (Supp. 1995) (in part) (based on UCC
§ 3-305):
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the right to enforce the
obligation of a party to pay an instrument is subject to the following:
*

* *

(b) a defense of the obligor stated in another section of this
chapter or a defense of the obligor that would be available if
the person entitled to enforce the instrument were enforcing
a right to payment under simple contract; and
(c) (I) a claim in recoupment of the obligor against the
original payee of the instrument if the claim arose from the
transaction that gave rise to the instrument;
(ii) but the claim of the obligor may be asserted against a
transferee of the instrument only to reduce the amount
owing on the instrument at the time the action is brought.
(2) The right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation of a
party to pay the instrument is subject to the defenses of the obligor
stated in Subsection (l)(a), but is not subject to defenses of the
obligor stated in Subsection (l)(b) or claims in recoupment stated in
Subsection (l)(c) against a person other than the holder.

Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-306 (Supp. 1995) (based on UCC § 3306):
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of
a holder in due course, is subject to a claim of a property or
possessory right in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim
to rescind a negotiation and to recover the instrument or its
proceeds. A person having rights of a holder in due course takes
free of the claim to the instrument.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order dated September 28, 1995 of the Third Circuit Court, Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding, granting Bank One's motion for
summary judgment. Judge Hutchings concluded that Bank One was entitled to enforce a check
against appellant Paul Herwit ("Herwit") in the amount of $9000. Herwit challenges Bank One's
efforts to enforce this check against him as either a holder or a holder in due course.

B. Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below
Bank One filed this action against Herwit on August 2,1995, and Herwit answered Bank
One's complaint on August 11,1995. On August 23, 1995, Bank One filed a motion for
summary judgment, which Herwit5 s trial counsel opposed with two affidavits. Bank One
subsequently filed a reply memorandum on September 14,1995. On September 28,1995, Judge
Michael L. Hutchings issued an order granting Bank One's motion for summary judgment.
Without issuing any findings, Judge Hutchings concluded that Bank One was entitled to enforce a
$9000 check against Herwit as a matter of law. Herwit timely appealed.

C. Statement of Facts
On or about May 19, 1995, Herwit drew check number 2526 on his account at First
Security Bank for $9000. The check was made payable to Aristocrat Travel and Cruises
("Aristocrat") and was meant to purchase ownership in the company. Herwit instructed Aristocrat
to hold on to the check until Herwit had enough funds in his account to cover it. Aristocrat was
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fully advised that the check would not clear until the closing on Herwit's condominium occurred.
However, on May 25,1995, an Aristocrat employee presented the check to Bank One for
payment.
Upon deposit of the check, Bank One credited Aristocrat's account for $9000, but did not
allow Aristocrat to immediately withdraw funds in the amount of the check. Bank One then sent
the check along to First Security Bank ("First Security") for collection. On May 30, 1995, without
awaiting word from First Security as to whether Herwit's check had cleared, Bank One allowed
Aristocrat to make a withdrawal in the amount of the check. That very same day, First Security
refused to accept Herwit's check and refused to remit payment thereon. First Security stamped
the instrument "RTM" (refer to maker) and returned it due to insufficient funds.
Rather than immediately debiting $9000 from Aristocrat's account, Bank One continued to
credit the account in the amount of Herwit's check. Over the next two months, the branch
manager at Bank One telephoned Capital Assets to inquire into whether there had been a closing
yet on Herwit's condo. During this same time, the branch manager also phoned Herwit to ask
about the closing. Herwit informed him that there had not yet been a closing and that he had no
idea whether one would ever take place.
Aristocrat subsequently became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy. As a result, Bank One
proceeded to enforce its claim to payment on the $9000 check against Herwit. On August 23,
1995, Bank One filed a motion for summary judgment with the circuit court. In support of its
motion, Bank One contended that it was a holder in due course. Bank One also argued that if it
was not a holder in due course, it was at least a holder of the check and was thus entitled to
enforce it against Herwit. Bank One's motion was opposed by two affidavits. On September 28,
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1995, the circuit court issued an order granting Bank One's motion for summary judgment.
Herwit appeals from this order.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When the facts are construed in the light most favorable to Herwit's position, at least two
genuine issues of material fact exist which effectively preclude the summary disposition of this
case. First, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Bank One was on notice that
Herwit's check would be dishonored when it was deposited and when Bank One allowed the
payee to make a withdrawal in the amount of the check. Second, a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether Bank One's actions in handling Herwit's check satisfy the test of good faith.
Since these issues remain unresolved, Bank One cannot properly enforce the $9000 check against
Herwit as a holder in due course.
Bank One's efforts to enforce the check against Herwit as a mere holder of the instrument
stand on even weaker ground. As a plain vanilla holder of the check, Bank One is subject to the
same defenses which Herwit can raise against the transferor of the check, Aristocrat. Herwit has
articulated several defenses against Aristocrat which thus apply equally well against Bank One.
These defenses effectively preclude Bank One from enforcing the instrument against Herwit.
Consequently, Bank One is not entitled to enforce the instrument as either a holder or as a holder
in due course. This Court should therefore reverse the circuit court's entry of summary judgment
in Bank One's favor.
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ARGUMENT
I.

BANK ONE HAS FAILED TO CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH
THE NONEXISTENCE OF ANY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT, THUS RENDERING THE SUMMARY DISPOSITION
OF THIS CASE INAPPROPRIATE

Senoii'i! <|ucNlionN iviiMin .is tu whether Itank( )nc piopeily qualities as m person eniitlcil in
enforce Herwit's $9000 check. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Bank One argued
also argued that if it did
not qualify as a holder in due course, it was at least a holder of the instrument and was therefore
entitled to enforce it against Herwit. The circuit court, without issuing any findings, granted Bank
One's motion for summary judgment. See Order of September 28,1995 ? at i.

: the circuit

court failed to issue any findings, if is not clear whether the court believed that Bank One was
entitled
however, genuine issues of material fact exist which effectively preclude the summary disposition

First, Bank One's ability to enforce the $9000 check against Herwit as a holder in due
course has not been conclusively established. In order to come within the protected status of a
holder in due course, a party must first satisfy several conditions. These conditions are outlined in
section 70A-3-302 of the Utah Code, which provides:
"[H]older in due course" means the holder of an instrument if: (a)
the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear
such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise
so irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity;
and (b) the holder took the instrument for value, in good faith,
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored
. . . , without notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized
signature or has been altered, without notice of any claim to the
instrument described in Section 70A-3-306, and without notice that
8

any party has a defense or claim in recoupment described in Section
70A-3-305(l).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302Q) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, a holder in due course is
a holder of a negotiable instrument who took the instrument for value in good faith and "without
notice that it was overdue or had been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the
part of any person." James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 14-2,
at 615 (1988).
Because holders in due course take their instruments free of almost all claims and defenses
that may arise, Bank One would prefer to be a holder in due course rather than just a plain vanilla
holder of the instrument. However, when the facts are construed in the light most favorable to
Herwit's position, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Bank One was on notice
that Herwit's check would not be honored. A genuine issue of material fact also exists as to
whether Bank One's actions satisfy the test of "good faith." As the party seeking the protected
status of a holder in due course, Bank One carries the burden of establishing that it has satisfied
both of these conditions. Seinfeld v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co.. 405 So. 2d 1039,1041 (Fla.
App. 3d Dist. 1981) (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment for bank which failed to
establish all of the elements of a holder in due course). Since it has failed to do so, it is not entitled
to enforce the $9000 check against Herwit as a holder in due course.
Bank One claims that in allowing Aristocrat to withdraw funds in the amount of the $9000
check, it was not on notice that Herwit's check would be dishonored. Instead, Bank One claims
that the only notice that it had was that the check would be honored. In support of this claim,
Bank One submitted an affidavit by Deanne Freeman, Bank One's Customer Service Manager. In
this affidavit, Freeman states that on May 30,1995, she personally contacted First Security Bank
9

to ask whether Herwit's check had cleared. Freeman Affidavit, para 5 Freeman also states that
1 it'st SiYiinh UTbalh ittlvtsi J lin ih.il \\w rhtvL had lk.vii lioiiunjj, iintl Ih;il sin1 hail llhiiiore
allowed Aristocrat to withdraw funds in the amount of the check. Freeman Affidavit, para. 5.
The affida\ its presented by Herwit below directly dispute this claim. Herwit's personal
affidavit states, "The affidavit of Deanne Freeman is incorrect. She indicated that defendant's
check was honored by defendant's bank. The check has never been honored and plaintiff *was

notice from defendant's bank that the check would not be honored." Herwit Affidavit, para. 7
(emphasis added).
Francee Jolley, the Operations Manager of the Park City branch of First Security Bank,
also submitted an affidavit disputing the claim by Bank One that First Security had honored
Herwit's check. In her affidavit, Jolley states
Security would honor the foregoing check. In fact, the check was not honored nor has i . vv • IKV .
hotioic'l " in|ie> AHvtovM | M U '• hi Mi' ncxl |uiiMM;iph

|ii

H> \ .ukl* " \^ operations manager, I

would be aware as to whether anyone in our office would have either honored the check or stated
to an.) pai t> that the check was hoiiored, I have discussed the matter with the Branch Manager. It
is against bank policy to honor a check received the way Mr. Herwit's was received. Neither the
Branch Manager nor me ever honored the foregoing check nor did we state to anyone that the
check would be honored. In fact, the check was dishonored on Mav
day to Bank One." Jolley Affidavit, para. 7.
Taken topethn (licsc jiffiiiiviK »,\\A\\\ laist" *i |vinuih' r. .inn ol iruit/na] l.icl A*< IM whether
Bank One was on notice that Herwit's check would not be honored. As a result, the circuit court's

entry of summary judgment in this case appears to have been improvidently granted. However,
there is another reason why this Court should reverse the circuit court's decision. Not only is there
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bank One was on notice that Herwit's check would
not be honored, but there is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bank One's actions
meet the test of "good faith."
Good faith is defined in § 70A-3-103 of the Utah Code. Section 70A-3-103 provides: "
'Good faith' means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-103 (Supp. 1995). Comment 4 to section 3-103 of the UCC,
upon which the Utah statute is based, provides clarification. It states, "[ajlthough fair dealing is a
broad term that must be defined in context, it is clear that it is concerned with the fairness of
conduct rather than the care with which an act is performed." UCC § 3-103 cmt. 4.
On two separate occasions in handling Herwit's check, Bank One failed to follow the
prescribed commercial practices which, had they been followed, would have prevented the loss in
this case. The first instance occurred on May 30, 1995, when Bank One, instead of waiting for
Herwit's check to clear, permitted Aristocrat to make a withdrawal in the amount of the check.
That very same day, First Security determined that the check would not clear, and returned it due
to insufficient funds. Had Bank One properly waited for the check to clear, as the normal
commercial practice clearly calls for, Bank One could have protected itself by not giving value on
the check.
The second instance occurred when Bank One continued to credit Aristocrat's account in
the amount of the check after learning that the check had been returned due to insufficient funds.
The prescribed commercial practice in this instance would have been to immediately debit
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Aristocrat's account. Instead, Bank One waited around for two months maintaining the
uim.m.mlal hope lh;il llir «-1 <»•. 111 f» on 1 loiwifs rondo would )?o through. The closing has never
gone through, and Aristocrat has since filed for bankruptcy. Had Bank One observed the normal
practice of immediately debiting Aristocra I s «u « oiinl, li<ml. ' >iu . nuM luu pit/vailcd flic loss in
this case. Since Bank One was in the best position to prevent the loss, there is a real question from
a policy vantage point as to whether it ought to properly fall within the protected status of a holder
in due course. See White & Summers § 14-2, at 615 (stating that a holder who learns of a defense
before giving value will never come within the status of a holder in due course).
Tk:iv is also a mil question us io wluMlici Miink ()nc\ handling of Herwit's check meets
the test of good faith. Although no Utah cases appear to be on point, Seinfeld v. Commercial
Bank & Trust Co., 405 Si >. 2d 1039 (F
appears to be on all fours with the instant action. In Seinfeld, the payee of three personal checks
went ahead and deposited the checks after reneging on a promise to the drawer that the checks
would not be negotiated. The depository bank paid on the checks, and then continued to credit the
payee's account after the checks were returned for insufficient funds. The bank subsequently sued
ilu iliii'Yf 1 hi mini i ha io niiiictuliiip ili.ii HI \VA . eimllod in otifoiu' than as a holder in due course.
The trial court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment, but the Florida District Court of
Appeals ievcisc.il In .iddicssnifj wkliici the lutii« luid mol lis buoieii oil provitij* thai il liii<l iwWd
in good faith, the court stated:
While we might agree with the bank that, standing alone, neither its
indulgence of a chronically overdrawn depositor nor its failure to
observe the normal commercial practices of waiting for the checks
to clear and determining the balance in Seinfeld's account before
paying on them might not have been sufficient evidence of "bad
faith," the coexistence of all of these factors raises at least a
12

reasonable inference that the bank acted as precipitately and
"foolishly" as it did in order to attempt to shift to Seinfeld its own
probable loss from Wolfson's machinations - an intent and
motivation which demonstrate the antithesis of good faith.
Id- at 1042. Similarly, Bank One's failure in the instant case to twice follow the prescribed
commercial practices for handling Herwif s check also seems to "demonstrate the antithesis of
good faith." As the court concluded in Seinfeld, "playing dumb is not the same as being dumb. A
mere protestation of one's own innocence is not enough conclusively to demonstrate that this is
really true when the trier of fact could find... that something more than simplemindedness lay
behind the conduct in question." Id.
Thus, at least two genuine issues of material fact exist which prevent the summary
disposition of this case. The first issue deals with whether Bank One was on notice that Herwit's
check would not be honored when the check was deposited and when Aristocrat attempted to
make a withdrawal in the amount of the check. The second issue concerns whether Bank One
acted in good faith in handling Herwif s check. Because these issues remain unresolved, Bank
One cannot properly qualify as a holder in due course. Therefore, the summary disposition of
this case is inappropriate, and this Court should reverse the circuit court's decision.

E.

BANK ONE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ENFORCE THE $9000 CHECK
AGAINST HERWIT AS A MERE HOLDER OF THE INSTRUMENT

Bank One contends that whether or not it properly qualifies as a holder in due course in the
instant case is irrelevant, since it claims that even if it were just a holder, it would still be entitled to
enforce the $9000 check against Herwit. However, the substantive rights of a holder who is not
also holder in due course are greatly restricted. A holder who is not also a holder in due course
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takes an instrument subject to: (a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; (b) all defenses of
niih p:nl\ vviiiirli would be \\\ iiilnhle in ..in .iihon mi <i sinipK1 I'oiilKitl, ft ) llir do lenses nil

>\.MII

or

failure of consideration, nonperformance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for
a special purpose; and, (d) the defenses of theft or breach of a restrictive indorsement. See White
and Summers § 14-10, at 642; Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-3-305, -306 (Supp. 1995). Bank One
contends that Herwit failed to present any of these defenses below Thus, Bank One contends that
even if it does not qualify as a holder in due coi irse it is still ent itled to e nforce the $9000 check
against Herwit as a mere holder of the instrument.

Herwit has raised several valid defenses negating Bank One's right to enforce the check against
him as a plain vanilla holder of the instrument. Herwit's own personal affidavit filed in opposition
to Bank One's motion for summary judgment is illustrative. In this affidavit, Herwit states that he
wrote the $9000 check to Aristocrat Travel in order to purchase ownership in the company.

Aristocrat that the check would not clear until he obtained final approval of a loan he was seeking.
JIITVUI

A l h d a u l fMiui

'

lit liiillici sidles lluil Anslottai jji'ieoil In Imhl mi In l!n; t l i n k unlil I he

loan was secured, and that Aristocrat breached this agreement. Herwit Affidavit, paras. 3 and 4.
Accordingly, Herwit has articulated several possible defenses negating Bank One's right to enforce
the check against him as a mere holder of the instrument, including violation of delivery for a
special purpose, breach of an oral agreement to hold on to the check, and failure of consideration
(i.e., the loan never w ent through, Aristocrat has • • bankrupt, and Hei w it has ne\ er received
anything of value for his money).

Although these defenses are primarily asserted against Aristocrat and not Bank One, this
fact is irrelevant. As White & Summers point out, the rights of a transferee (Bank One) to enforce
an instrument are generally no stronger than the rights of the transferor (Aristocrat). White &
Summers §14-6, at 52 (Supp. 1993). Hence, as a mere holder of the instrument, Bank One is
subject to the same defenses which Herwit could raise against Aristocrat. Since Herwit has raised
several valid defenses against Aristocrat, and thus, Bank One as well, appellee is not entitled to
enforce the $9000 check against Herwit as a mere holder of the instrument. Therefore, this Court
should reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Bank One.

IE.

BANK ONE IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW

Not only has Bank One failed to establish the nonexistence of any genuine issues of
material fact in this case, but Bank One has also failed to establish that it is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. In fact, it appears that Bank One cannot carry this burden, because the law seems
to be squarely on Herwit's side.
First, the possibility that Bank One was on notice that Herwit's check would be dishonored
precludes any chance for Bank One to qualify as a holder in due course. As stated in White &
Summers,
[i]f the holder of the instrument learns of a defense before he has
given value, there will never be a single instant in which the holder
meets all of the conditions of 3-304. Such a holder does not
become a holder in due course. Because he had not given value
when he received notice, he does not fall within the policy of the
statute. Upon receiving notice of the defense the holder can protect
himself and insure that he does not give value (as by freezing the
account and barring the depositor from withdrawing the funds
represented by the check).
15

White & Summers § 14-2, at 615.
Second, the holding in Seinfeld also demonstrates that Bank One is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In that case, the court on almost identical facts reversed the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of a bank which sought to enforce a check against the
drawer as a holder in due course. Seinfeld, 405 So. 2d at 1041. The court stated, "[s]urely, the
'circumstances of the holder's taking the checks were (not) free of all doubt' so as to permit the
summary disposition rendered below." Id at 1042. The same reasoning would seem to apply in
this case.
Accordingly, absent a finding by the trier of fact that Bank One gave value on Herwit's
check without having notice that the check would be dishonored, and absent a finding that Bank
One's actions meet the test of "good faith," Bank One is not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law as a holder in due course. Nor is Bank One entitled to judgment as a matter of law as a mere
holder of the instrument. As a plain vanilla holder of the $9000 check, Bank One is subject to the
same defenses which Herwit could raise against Aristocrat. Herwit has raised several valid
defenses negating Bank One's right to enforce the check. Consequently, Bank One is also not
entitled to enforce the $9000 check against Herwit as a plain vanilla holder of the instrument. This
Court should therefore reverse the circuit court's entry of summary judgment in Bank One's favor.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse the decision of the
circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Bank One. Summary judgment is
inappropriate in this case because when the facts are construed in the light most favorable to
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appellant's position, it is clear that Bank One has failed to conclusively demonstrate the
nonexistence of any genuine issues of material fact. Moreover, summary judgment is also
inappropriate because Bank One is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, this
Court should reverse the circuit court's decision and remand the case for trial.
DATED this 29th day of December, 1995.
Respectfully submitted,

Grant W. P. Morrison, Attorney for Appellant
Paul Herwit

17

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that I mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing brief to:
Arnold Richer
MarkE. Medcalf
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellee Bank One
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Arnold Richer - 2751
David W. Overholt - A3846
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ooOoo
BANK ONE, UTAH National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
:

Plaintiff,
v,
:

Civil No. 950009179 CV

PAUL HERWIT,
Judge Hutchings
Defendant.
ooOoo
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment having been submitted
to

the

Court

pursuant

to Rule

4-501, Utah Rules

of

Judicial

Administration, and Plaintiff and Defendant being represented by
counsel and the Honorable Judge Michael L. Hutchings, one of the
judges of the above-entitled court, having reviewed Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and having entered a decision thereon
(Minute Entry of September 19, 1995), and the court being fully
advised

in

the

premises,

and

upon

motion

Overholt, P . C , attorneys for Plaintiff,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

of

Richer,

Swan

&

Civil No. 950009179 CV
Judge Michael L. Hutchings

1.

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

is

hereby

granted.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded Judgment as against Defendant Paul

Herwit in the amount of $9,000.00 as of May 19, 1995, plus interest
at the statutory rate of 9.22% per annum thereafter until paid in
full.
3.
Defendant

Plaintiff

is

Paul Herwit

further

awarded

Judgment

as

against

in the sum of $92.00 representing

costs

incurred herein.
4.
augmented

It

is

further

in the amount

ordered

that

this

of costs expended

Judgment

shall

in collecting

Judgment by execution or otherwise.
DATED this

day of September, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS
Third Circuit Court Judge
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be

said
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Judge Michael L. Hutchings

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

of September, 1995, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
H. Delbert Welker
Attorney for Defendant
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, UT 84120
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Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ooOoo
BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,

:
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
:

Plaintiff,
v.
PAUL HERWIT,

Civil No. 95000S179 CV

Defendant.

Judge Hutchings
ooOoo

Plaintiff, Bank One, Utah, by and through the law firm of
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P . C , hereby moves this Court pursuant to
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for the entry of summary
judgment against Defendant Paul Herwit.

This Motion is supported

by

filed

the

Affidavit

of

Deanne

Freeman,

contemporaneously

herewith and a Memorandum setting forth the undisputed facts and
applicable points of law.
Pursuant thereto, Plaintiff believes that there are sufficient
grounds for this Court to enter a summary judgment against the
Defendant Paul Herwit on the basis that no material issues of fact

Civil No. 950009179
J u d g e Hutchings

exist

and that

Plaintiff

is entitled,

as a matter of law, to

judgment against Defendant Paul Herwit in the amount of $9,000.00
as of May 19, 1995, plus interest thereafter at the highest legal
rate per annum until paid in full and costs of court.
DATED this ^ 3

day of August, 1995.
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.

M^rk £. Mescalf

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

J) /

day of August, 1995, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
H. Delbert Welker
Attorney for Defendant
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, UT 84120
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Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ooOoo
BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,

:
PLAINTIFFfS MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOB
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:
:

Plaintiff,
v.
PAUL HERWIT,

Civil No. 950009179 CV

Defendant.

Judge Kutchings
oo 3 oo

Plaintiff, Bank One, Utah, by and through the law firm of
Richer,

Swan

&

Overholt,

P.C,

hereby

submits

uhe

following

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

This Memorandum is supported by the

Affidavit of Deanne Freeman filed contemporaneously herewith.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

On May 19, 1995 Defendant executed Check Nc. 2526 drawn

on his account at First Security Bank in the amount of $9,000.00
(See,

Plaintiff's

Complaint

admission in response thereto.

at

paragraph

5

and

Defendant's

See also, a copy of Check No. 2526,

Civil No. 950009179
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attached hereto as Exhibit

"A" and incorporated herein by this

reference).
2.
Aristocrat
"Payee").

Check

No.

Travel
(See,

2526

was

made

and Cruises of
Plaintiff's

payable

Park City,

Complaint

at

to

the

Inc.

order

of

(hereinafter

paragraph

6

and

Defendant's admission in response thereto).
3.

On or aboat May IS, 1995 Check No. 2526 was presented to

Plaintiff for payment by the Payee.

(See, Plaintiff's Complaint at

paragraph 7 and Defendant's admission in response thereto).
4.
checking

On May 19, 1995 the Payee deposited Check No. 2526 to its
account,

No.

13477545,

at

Bank

One,

Utah.

(See,

Plaintiff's Complaint at paragraph 7 and Defendant's admission in
response thereto and Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 4 ) . 1
5.

Following

deposit

by

the

Payee

of

Check

No.

2526

Plaintiff credited Payee's account, No. 13477545, in the amount of
$9,000.00.
6.

(See, Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 5 ) .
Subsequent to receiving credit for Check No. 2526 the

Payee withdrew from its account the funds so credited.
Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 6 ) .

1

(See,
v

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges deposit of Check No. 2526.
This is undenied by the Defendant and therefore admitted pursuant
to Rule 8(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
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7.

Subsequent

to

receipt

of

Check

No.

2526

Plaintiff

presented the same for payment to First Security Bank, the drawee
thereon.
8.

(See, Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 7 ) .
The drawee refused to honor Check No. 2 52 6 by reason of

insufficient funds and returned the same to Plaintiff bearing the
notation "RTM" (refer to maker) . (See, Affidavit of Deanne Freeman
at paragraph 7 and Exhibit "A"). 9.

Check No. 2526 does not bear any evidence cf forgery or

alteration, apparent or otherwise, and is regular and complete on
its face.
10.

(See, Exhibit " A " ) .
Plaintiff, prior to taking Check No. 2526, was never

provided notice of any defect in the instrument, default in the
instrument or any defense or claim to it by any party.

(See,

Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 8).
11.

Plaintiff remains in possession of Check No. 2526.

Affidavit of Deanne Freeman at paragraph 9).

(See,

The original Check

No. 2526 is presently in the possession of Plaintiff's counsel and
is available for inspection by the parties and/or the Court.
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ARGUMENT

PLAINTIFF, AS HOLDER AND HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
OF CHECK NO. 2 526, IS ENTITLED TO ENFORCE THE
SAME AGAINST THE SIGNER THEREOF
Defendant wrote a check for which his account did not contain
sufficient funds.

The check was drawn on First Security Bank.

Payee deposited the check in its account at Bank One, Utah.

The
Bank

One credited the account of the Payee and permitted the Payee to
withdraw the sums so credited.
First

Security

Defendant's check was dishonored by

Bank upon presentment.

Pursuant

to negotiable

instruments law, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for the face
amount of Check No. 2526.
Defendant admits that he is the drawer of Check No. 2 526.
Under Utah law if a draft is dishonored2 the drawer is obliged to
pay the draft according to its terms.

Subsection 70A-3-414(2),

Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
The

drawer's

liability

may

be

enforced

by

any

Subsection 70A-3-301, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
in

due

course

Subsection

(hereinafter

70A-3-302(1),

"HDC")

Utah

Code

2

A check is a species of draft.
Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
4

is

a

Ann.

species
(1953

as

of

holder.
A holder
holder.
amended).

Subsection 70A-3-104(6), Utah
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Therefore, Plaintiff is an HDC of Check No. 2526 and therefore
takes the instrument free of any ordinary contract defenses which
the drawer may claim.

Subsection 70A-3-305(2), Utah Code Ann.

(1953 as amended).
The law establishes two criteria for determining whether or
not a holder is in fact an HDC.

A holder receives the status of

HDC with regard to an instrument if:
[T]he instrument when issued or negotiated to
the holder does not bear such apparent
evidence of forgery or alternation or is not
otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to
call into question its authenticity;
Subsection 70A-3-302(1)(a) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
The instrument in question has been submitted to the Court.
It bears no evidence of forgery or alteration whatsoever, much less
any apparent evidence of forgery or alteration.

On the contrary,

there has been no claim made by the Defendant of forgery, lack of
authenticity or of any irregularity in the face of the instrument.
The second requirement is that the holder takes the instrument
for value in good faith and without notice of any defects in the
instrument.

Subsection

70A-3-302 (b) , Utah Code Ann.

(1953

as

amended).
Plaintiff meets all of these requirements.

5
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at Subsection 70A-3-303(l) (b) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) . A
holder

has

security

given

interest

value
in it.

for an

instrument

when

he

acquires a

Whether a party acquires a security

interest in an instrument is controlled by Subsection 70A-4-210(l)
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) which reads as follows:
A collecting bank has a security interest in
an item and any accompanying documents or
other proceeds of either:
(a)
in case of an item deposited in an
account, to the extent to which credit given
for the item has been withdrawn or applied;
It is undisputed that this instrument was deposited to the account
of the Payee.

The account was credited and the credit withdrawn.

Finally an HDC must take the instrument
without notice of certain enumerated defects.
been raised

in this

regard.

in good faith and
Again, no issue has

The Affidavit

of Deanne

Freeman

establishes that Plaintiff took the instrument in question without
notice of any defects thereto.
assured

by

the

drawee,

First

In fact, Plaintiff was verbally
Security

Bank,

that

there

were

sufficient funds to cover the check and that it would be honored.
It is the Defendant's contention, as stated in his Answer,
that at the time he delivered the instrument to its Payee the Payee
had knowledge that the check was drawn on insufficient funds and

6
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that the Payee was not authorized to deposit the check.

However,

the knowledge of the Payee cannot be charged to Plaintiff.

This is
>••••

specifically__the kind of defense which is unavailable against an
HDC.

This is made clear by the official comments to the Uniform

Commercial Code which expressly state that the "defenses" which are
unavailable
delivery

to a

drawee

or delivery

include

the defense

of

for a special purpose."

"conditional

(See , Official

Comments at paragraph 3 ) .
The only notice which the Defendant

alleges was given to

Plaintiff was notice "that the check would not clear" (Defendant's
answer at paragraph 5 ) . This allegation is of course disputed by
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is not in the practice of honoring checks

presented to it when simultaneously informed that the check is
drawn on insufficient funds.

However, even if the allegation were

true it would not deprive Plaintiff of HDC status.
Subsection 70A-3-302 specifically enumerates those classes of
notice which would deprive a holder of HDC status.

Those specific

types of notice are as follows: (1) that the instrument is overdue;
(2) that the instrument has been dish^nrf^;
uncured

default with respect

(3) That there is an

to payment of another

instrument

issued as part of the same series; (4) notice that the instrument

7
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contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered; (5) notice
of a claim to the instrument described in § 70A-3-306 (claims not
relevant herein); and (6) notice that any party has a defense or
claim

in

recoupment

described

in

§ 70A-3-305(l)

(claims

and

defenses not applicable herein) .
Thus, Plaintiff is, as a matter of law, an HDC entitled to
enforce the instrument.
EVEN AS A HOLDER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT.
The

most

fundamental

flaw

in

the

Defendant ! s

denial

of

liability is that, even if Plaintiff is not an HDC, Plaintiff is
still entitled to recovery on the instrument.

The fact that the

check was drawn on insufficient funds does not relieve Defendant of
his liability on the instrument.
As noted

earlier,

in the event of dishonor, a drawer

obligated to pay a draft according to its terms.

is

(Subsection 70A-

3-414, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)).

As stated earlier, the

drawer's obligation is to pay the holder.

(Subsection 70A-3-301,

Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) ) . It is undisputed that Plaintiff
is thus holder.

The instrument is in Plaintiff's possession and

available for inspection.

The only issue which remains is whether

the instrument has been dishonored.

8

Civil No. 950009179
Judge Hutchings

Dishonor is defined at Subsection 70A-3-502 Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended) as follows:
If a draft is payable on demand and subsection
(a) does not apply the draft is dishonored if
presentment for payment is duly made to the
drawee and the draft is not paid on the day of
presentment.
Presentment is defined at Subsection 7QA-3-501, Utah Code Ann.
(19 53 as amended) as follows:
"Presentment" means a demand made by or on
behalf of a person entitled zo enforce an
instrument to pay the instrument made to the
drawee or a party obliged
to pay
the
instrument or, in the case of a note or
accepted draft payable at a bank, to the bank,
or to accept a draft made to the drawee.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff is the holder.

The instrument in

question was presented to the drawee, First Security Bank, and was
not paid upon presentment.

On the contrary, it was returned due to

insufficient funds and marked "Return to Maker".
The check before this Court is, itself, a species of contract.
Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. Frandsen, 2 51 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 2
(Utah App. 1994) . The check is clear, complete and unambiguous on
its face.
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When the existence of a contract and
identity of its parties are not in issue
when the contract provisions are clear
complete the meaning of the contract
appropriately be resolved by the court
summary judgment.

the
and
and
can
on

Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201
(Utah 1983).
It is equally clear that the Defendant has not fulfilled his
duty to pay the face amount of the check to the holder.

The

Defendant's position that the fact that the check was drawn on
insufficient funds somehow relieves him of liability is absurd.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests Judgment in the
amount of $9,000.00 as of May 19, 1995 plus interest thereafter at
the highest legal rate per annum until paid in full and costs of
court.
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that the Defendant executed a check which was
paid by the Plaintiff.

While the Defendant's position is somewhat

unclear, it appears to be his position that he is free to do so,
creating negotiable instruments and casting them upon the sea of
commerce with no responsibility whatsoever for the fact that he has
no ability to back the instrument so signed.

This position is

fundamentally flawed and is simply not the law of the State of
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Utah.

Plaintiff, as a matter of law, is entitled to judgment

against the Defendant as requested.
DATED this

:?/

day of August, 19 95.
RICHER, SWAN & 0VERH0LTf P.C.

B y

:/•-,

;

•
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•'

Mark E. Medcalf

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the J$J_ day of August, 1995, I
caused a :rue and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
H. Delbert Welker
Attorney for Defendant
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, UT 84120
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Park City, Utah 84060
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Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 53 9-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ooOoo
BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,

:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF DEANNE FREEMAN
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
PAUL KERWIT,

Civil No. 950009179 CV

Defendant.

Judge Hutchings
ooOoo

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
: ss .
)

I, Deanne Freeman, being first duly sworn depose and say as
follows:
1.

I am the Customer Service Manager of the Bountiful office

of Bank One, Utah.
2.

By virtue of my responsibilities in regard thereto I have

access to the records of Bank One, Utah as they pertain to the
negotiable instrument which is the subject matter of the present
action and transactions affecting the account of the payee thereon

Civil No. 950009179
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Aristocrat Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc.
3.

Records produced herewith are maintained in the ordinary

course of business of Bank One, Utah.
4.

On May 25, 1995 check number 2526 drawn on the account of

Paul Herwit at First Security Bank was deposited to the account of
Aristocrat Travel and Cruises of Park City, Inc., account number
13477545, at Bank One, Utah.
attached hereto as Exhibit

A copy of check number 2526 is

"A" and incorporated herein by this

reference.
5.

On May 3 0 I contacted First Security Bank to inquire as

zo whether check number 2526 had cleared First Security Bank.

I

was advised on May 30, 1995 that the check had been honored, and I
credited the payee's account accordingly.
6.
withdrew

After receiving credit for check number 2526 the payee
from

its

account

the

funds

so credited.

Copies

of

relevant monthly statements are attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and
incorporated herein by this reference.
7.

On or about May 31, 1995 First Security Bank refused to

accept check number 2526 and refused to remit payment thereon.

The

instrument was returned due to insufficient funds and bearing the
notation "RTM" (refer to maker).
2
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8.

Paul Herwit is not a client of Bank One, Utah.

Prior to

honoring his check Bank One, Utah received no communication or
notice from Paul Herwit regarding check number 2526.
9.

Bank One, Utah is currently in possession of check number

2526.
Further affiant sayeth not.
DATED this Q ^ l ^ d a y of August, 1995.

LJ^lAMr^la^
Deanne Freeman
t

SUBSCRIBED

^UouJ-r

,

AND SWORN

to before

me this

^¥

day

1995.

~zr
j^^'^

£*/'

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in JST<-C<:^
My Commission Expires:

„,

I
I

3

VIIH^/

tali

of Utah

i

of
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
*> <

I hereby certify that on the

J) I

day of August, 1995, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
H. Delbert Welker
Attorney for Defendant
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, UT 84120
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BANKEONE.
ACCOUNT NUMBER
1347-7545

VALLEY BUSINESS CHECKING

BOUNTIFUL OFFICE
510 SOUTH 200 WEST
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH

285 10-19

00

84010

285

ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL fc CRUISES OF PARK
CITY INC
3330 S 700 E » 112
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106-1544

QUESTIONS? CALL:
481-5600

ACCOtNT SUMMARY AS OF 05-31-95
-

BALANCE SUMMARY

-

rS'
x

BEGINNING BALANCE AS OF 04-28-95
PLUS
4 DEPOSITS/CREDITS
LESS
11 CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
LESS SERVICE CHARGE
ENDING BALANCE AS OF 05-31-95
LOW BALANCE

DEPOSITS
ITEMS DEPOSITED
MONTHLY MAINTENANCE

,^

*

2,366.07^^

20,562.25
32,266.97
7.41

\ \ ^ ' **

9,346.06-^'

9,346.06-

EARNINGS CREDIT SUMMARY AVERAGE COLLECTED BALANCE
X EARNINGS CREDIT FACTOR
* EARNINGS ALLOWANCE
SERVICE

'•• •
'••'

866.7700.47502
.00

SERVICE CHARGE SUMMARY NUMBER OF
UNIT
UNITS
PRICE
3
0.250
4
0.040
6.50

SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL
EARNINGS ALLOWANCE
NET SERVICE CHARGE

CHARGE
FOR SERVICE
0.75
0.16
6.50
7.41
.00
7.41

DEPOSITS/CREDITS
DATE
DESCRIPTION
05-11 DEPOSIT
05-18 DEPOSIT

AMOUNT
4.071.66
1,000.00

DATE
DESCRIPTION
05-25 DEPOSIT
05-30 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT

AMOUNT
9,000 .00
6,490 .59

CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
DATE
05-03
05-10
05-17
05-26
05-31
05-31
05-31

PED 042395
PED 043095
PED 050795
PED 051495
RETURN FEE
CHECK CHG
RTN ITM

DATE
DESCRIPTION
05-10 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
05-17 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE

DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION
ARC SETTLEMENT
0503 46528565
ARC SETTLEMENT
0510 46528565
ARC SETTLEMENT
0517 46528565
ARC SETTLEMENT
0526 46528565
BANK ONE UTAH NA
0531
CHECK PRINTING
0526
BANK ONE UTAH NA
0531
AMOUNT
15.00
15.00

DATE
DESCRIPTION
05-26 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
05-31 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE

0 ENCLOSURES
THANK YCU POP BANKING WITH BANK ONE
MEMBER c^iC

117

134 7- 75A 5

UTAH.

AMOUNT
2,221 .30
A,171 .66

724.61

6,071 .40

2 .00
16,,00

9,000.00
AMOUNT

15.00
15.00

•••'A

ACCOUNT NUMBER
1347-7545 m

VALLEY BUSINESS CHECKING

285 10-19

BOUNTIFUL OFFICE
510 SOUTH 200 yEST
BOUNTIFUL. UTAH

00

8*010

285

ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL t CRUISES OF PARK
CITY INC
3330 S 700 E # 112
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8*106-1544

QUESTIONS? CALL:
481-5600
-A'VH

ACCOUNT SUMMARY AS OF 06-30-95
BALANCE SUMMARY
BEGINNING BALANCE AS OF 05-31-95
PLUS
3 DEPOSITS/CREDITS
LESS
7 CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
LESS SERVICE CHARGE
ENDING BALANCE AS OF 06-30-95

9,346.06-

-jOJ ,Mfc~

14,671, 35
14,393, 29
6. 87

r$
9,074.87-

12,550,50-

LOU BALANCE

EARNINGS CREDIT SUMMARY
AVERAGE COLLECTED BALANCE
X EARNINGS CREDIT FACTOR
» EARNINGS ALLOWANCE
- SERVICE
DEPOSITS
ITEMS DEPOSITED
MONTHLY MAINTENANCE

10,252.1900.47501
.00

SERVICE CHARGE SUMMARY NUMBER OF
UNIT
UNITS
PRICE
1
0.250
3
0.040
6.50

CHARGE
FOR SERVICE
0.25
0.12
6.50
6.87
.00
6.87

SERVICE CHARGE TOTAL
EARNINGS ALLOWANCE
NET SERVICE CHARGE
DEPOSITS/CREDITS
AMOUNT
1,637.70
1,912.80

DATE
DESCRIPTION
06-02 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT
06-06 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT

DATE
DESCRIPTION
06-08 DEPOSIT

AMOUNT
11,120.85

CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
DATE
05-31 PED 052195
06-07 PED 052895

DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION
ARC SETTLEMENT
0531 46528565
ARC SETTLEMENT
0607 46528565
AMOUNT
15.00
17.00
17.00

DATE
DESCRIPTION
05-31 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
06-07 OVERORAFT CHECK CHARGE
06-14 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE

DATE
DESCRIPTION
06-21 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE
06-28 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE

0 ENCLOSURES

THANK

0 17

1347-7545

Y O U P Q R BAfsjKiNG V / i T H B A N K
MEM8EP PDfC

OU£

JTAM

NA

AMOUNT
3,189.44
11,120.85
AMOUNT
17.00
17.00

BAHK50NE.
ACCOUNT NUMBER
1347-7545
.

VALLEY BUSINESS CHECKING

285 10-19

BOUNTIFUL OFFICE
510 SOUTH 2 0 0 WEST

BOUNTIFUL,

UTAH

00

84010

285

ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL & CRUISES OF PARK

CITY INC

3330 S 700 E * 112
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4 1 0 6 - 1 5 4 4

QUESTIONS? CALL:
481-5600
.^%

ACCOUNT SUMMARY AS OF 0 7 - 3 1 - 9 5
BALANCE SUMMARY
9,074.87-

BEGINNING BALANCE AS OF 06-30-95
PLUS
4 DEPOSITS/CREDITS
LESS
7 CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
LESS SERVICE CHARGE
ENDING BALANCE AS OF 07-31-95
LOW BALANCE

18,234.42
9,159.55
.00

t-1

.00

9,142.87DEPOSITS/CREDITS

DATE
DESCRIPTION
07-06 DEPOSIT
07-12 DEPOSIT

AMOUNT
3,854.93
5,219.62

DATE
DESCRIPTION
07-26 MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT
07-31 OVERDRAFT CHARGE-OFF

AMOUNT
34.00
9,125.87

CHECKS/WITHDRAWALS
DATE
07-05 PED 062595
07-12 PED 070295

DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION
ARC SETTLEMENT
0705 46528565
ARC SETTLEMENT
0712 46528565

DATE
DESCRIPTION
07-05 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE
07-11 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE
07-12 OVERDRAFT CHECK CHARGE

AMOUNT
17.00
17.00
17.00

DATE
DESCRIPTION
07-19 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE
07-25 RETURNED CHECK CHARGE

0 ENCLOSURES

THANK

8 17

1 3 4 7 - 7 54 5

YOU P O P B A N K I N G W ! T M B A , \ V

O'if.

'JTAH

*/A

AMOUNT
3,854.93
5,219.62
AMOUNT
17.00
17.00

H. Delbert Welker (3418)
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: 963-0555
Attorneys for Defendant
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL HERWIT
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 950009179
vs.
PAUL HERWIT,
Defendant.

:
:

Judge: Hutchings

PAUL HERWIT, having been duly sworn, hereby deposes and
states the following:
1.

The affiant is the defendant in the above matter.

2.

On or about M&y 19, 1995, affiant wrote a check to

his employer, Aristocrat Travel in the amount of $9,000.00 to
purchase ownership in the company.
3. When affiant delivered the check to his employer, he
informed his employer that the check would not clear until he
received final approval of the loan he was seeking.

His employer

agreed to hold the check until the loan was secured.
4.

On or about May 26, 1995, defendant's employer,

inadvertantly and without defendant's knowledge and authorization,
deposited the check in its business account at Bank One.

5. Shortly thereafter, defendant received many telephone
calls from Gary Finnegan, Manager of Bank One in Bountiful,

Mr.

Finnegan called defendant for a period of two months and called
defendant in his home and at his office.
6. Mr. Finnegan's purpose for calling was to verify when
defendant would receive the loan and make the check good. From the
date plaintiff received defendant's check to the present, plaintiff
knew that the check would not clear defendant's bank.
7.

The affidavit of Deanne Freeman is incorrect.

She

indicated that defendant's check was honored by defendant's bank.
The check has never been honored and plaintiff was given notice
many times by defendant that the check would not be honored and
plaintiff also had notice from defendant's bank that the check
waould not be honored.
Dated this _f_

day of

t$^^JMJ

, 1995.

^ V ( ^ / / ^

PAUL HERWIT

Jt£

i

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this

Q

day of

'JhJUl^AA 1/£/?, 1995.
NOTARY PUBLIC
IUJEAN YATO
^
1514 Park Ave. P.p. Box 1660
Park City, Utah 84060
COMM&ION EXPIRES
NOV. 20. 1995
S1ATEOFU1AH

ry/7Public
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Affidavit of Paul Herwit to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN &
OVERHOLT, 311 South Stats<-S*seey/ #280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on thls^/ day of \^>&n^£^
, 1995.

H. Delbert WelJcer (3418)
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: 963-0555
Attorneys for Defendant
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANCEE JOLLEY
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
:
Civil No. 950009179

vs.
PAUL HERWIT,
Defendant.

Judge: Hutchings
:

FRANCEE JOLLEY, having been duly sworn, hereby deposes
and states the following:
1.

The affiant is the Operations Manager of the Park

City, branch of First Security Bank.
2.

The affiant has personal knowledge of the following

events.
3. On May 26, 1995, Friday afternoon. Memorial Day Weekend, the Park City, branch of First Security Bank received a check
on the account of Paul Herwit, #2526 in the amount of $9,000.00.
4. Mr, Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to
cover the check.
5.

On Tuesday M&y 30, 1995, the day after the holiday,

Mr. Herwit's account did not have sufficient funds to cover the
check and the check was returned to Bank One on that day.

To my

knowledge, check #2526 has never been paid by First Security Bank.
Dated this/Z^ay of

^£^^J>^

ubscribed and Sworn to bef
, 1995.
NOTARY PUBIC
JUDITH A. FUTMAN

1S14 ?MkSttmtf?XX Box 1660
ftrkOfcUr 84060

u/fcfA

ary Public

,

, 1995.

this Jj_

day of

^ ) T £ ^ ^

COMM&ONfXPWS
(XT. 11,1997

STATE OF UTAH

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Affidavit of Prancee Jolley to Arnold Richer, Esq. RICHER, SWAN &
OVERHOLT, 311 South Stj^~SETOt^#280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
1995
on this // day of C><^L^frL^

Arnold Richer - 2751
Mark E. Medcalf -5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Bank One, Utah, N.A.
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
-ooOooBANK ONE, UTAH, National
Association, fka VALLEY BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, National
Association,

PLAINTIFF • S REPLY MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 950009179 CV
PAUL HERWIT,
Judge Hutchings
Defendant.
-ooOooPlaintiff, Bank One, Utah, N.A. by and through the law firm
of Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C. hereby submits the following Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
This Reply Memorandum is being submitted in reply to those items
raised in the Affidavits of Paul Herwit and Francee Jolley filed in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
00011577.E95

C M No. 950009179 CV
Judge Michael L HutcNngs

POINT I
THE ALLEGATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S OPPOSING AFFIDAVITS
ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE ENFORCEABILITY
OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT IN QUESTION
Plaintiff is attempting to enforce the Defendant's maker
liability on check number 2526.

Plaintiff has argued in its

original Memorandum that Plaintiff has a status of both a holder
and a holder in due course (hereinafter "HDC") of this check. The
distinction, with regard to enforcement of instruments, between a
holder and an HDC is set forth in § 70A-3-305. An HDC can enforce
an instrument free of the maker's contract defenses to that
instrument.

A holder may also enforce an instrument, but subject

to a maker's ordinary contract defenses.
If the maker raises no defenses to the enforceability of the
instrument, the holder's status as either a holder or an HDC is
irrelevant.
This is specifically the situation before this court.
Through the Affidavits filed in opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant attempts to raise issues
regarding notice which Plaintiff may or may not have had at the
time check number 2526 was negotiated.

Plaintiff does not concede

that it had any kind of notice at the time it accepted check number
00011577.E95
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C M I NO. 950009179 CV
Judge Michael L Hutchings

2526.

However, it is irrelevant.

Notice is only relevant because

in order to receive the status of an HDC, a holder must take a
check without notice of the following defects.
(1)

That the instrument is overdue;

(2)

That the instrument has been dishonored;

(3)

That there is an uncured default with respect
to payment of another instrument issued as
part of the same series;

(4)

That the instrument contains an unauthorized
signature or has been altered;

(5)

Without notice of any claim to the instrument
described in § 70A-3-306; and,

(6)

Without notice that any party has a defense or
claim in recoupment described in §70A-3305(1).

§ 70A-3-302(l)(b), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
If the Defendant's affidavits raise an issue with regard to
notice, this would reduce Plaintiff's position from that of an HDC
to that of a holder.
subject to defenses.

The holder has the right to enforce the check
However, the Defendant has raised none,

either by answer or through a memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment.

Therefore, the Defendant's allegations are irrelevant

and Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.

00011577.E95
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Judge Michael L Hutchings

POINT II
THE DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS DO NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF
FACT AS TO "NOTICE" WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF
FROM HAVING THE STATUS OF AN HDC
As set forth in Plaintiff's original Memorandum, there are
three requirements for HDC status.

First, the instrument in

question must bear no apparent evidence of forgery or alteration.
The second requirement is that the holder take the instrument for
value. Neither of these elements are challenged by the Defendant.
The third requirement is that the holder take the instrument in
good faith without notice of the defects described above. § 70A-3302(1)(a) and (b).
The Defendant has not alleged that Plaintiff had notice of any
of those items set forth in § 70A-3-302(b).

The Defendant only

alleges that Plaintiff had notice of insufficiency of funds in the
maker's account. The Defendant's contention that this suffices to
defeat HDC status leads to an impossible conclusion.

If notice of

insufficiency of funds, obtained when a holder presents a check for
collection only to have it dishonored, precludes one from having
HDC status, no party would ever have HDC status to collect a bad
check since one is only attempting to enforce instruments which
have been dishonored.
00011577.E95

Finally, the Defendant has not even raised
4

Civil No. 950009179 CV
Judge Michael L HutcNngs

an issue with regard to Plaintiff's notice at the time the check
was negotiated.
It is essential to keep in mind the precise language of § 70A3-302, which begins with the following language:
the i n s t n imei i I:

. . *i :i thout i n :>tlce. . . "

"the holder took
If t:l: le i: equir ement is

that a holder take an instrument without notice, the only notice
which would be relevant is notice the holder had at the time it

By the Defendant's own admission (Affidavit of Paul Herwit at
Paragraph 4) the check was deposited at Bank One on May 26, 1995.
The Defendant goes on to allege in Paragraph 5 of his Affidavit
that

it

was

thereafter

only

thereafter,

and

for

a

period

of

two

months

that an officer of Bank One contacted him request iiiq

that he make his check good,

There is nothing in the Affidavit of

Mr. Herwit to suggest that the Bank had notice of the insufficiency
of funds in the Defendant's account prioi

" > taking the i nstrument.

This is of course natural since the maker of an instrument could
not

reasonably

communicate

with

the

third

party

to whom

it

is

negotiated since he (Ines niini have any knowledge of the i ienti try mi
the third party to whom his payee may negotiate the check.

The

Affidavit of Deeann Freeman filed in support of Plaintiff's Motion

00011577. E95
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for Summary Judgment states that, prior to taking check number
2526, Plaintiff had no notice of any kind from Defendant Herwit.
This allegation is un-rebutted.
Finally, the Defendant alleges in Paragraph 3 of his Affidavit
that the payee, Aristocrat Travel, had notice that the check was
drawn on insufficient funds.

Initially, it should be noted that

this notice cannot be imputed to Plaintiff. Secondly, it should be
noted that this is specifically the kind of situation from which
the Uniform Commercial Code attempts to protect an HDC.
Since the amendment of the negotiable instruments section of
the Uniform Commercial Code in 1993, there have been no Utah cases
clarifying the purpose or intent of statutes concerning HDC status.
However, the purpose of the Rule is made clear by the official
comments thereto.
If buyer issues an instrument to seller and buyer
has a defense against seller, that defense can
obviously be asserted. Buyer and seller are the
only people involved.
The holder-in-due-course
doctrine has no relevance. The doctrine applies
only in cases in which more than two parties are
involved. Its essence is that the holder-in-duecourse does not have to suffer the consequences of
a defense of the obligor on the instrument that
arose from an occurrence with a third party.
(Commercial and Debtor/Creditor Law, selected
statutes 1995 edition, Foundation Press, §3-305
Page 333, Comment 2.)

00011577.E95

6

C M I NO. 950009179 CV
Judge Michael L Hutchings

Thus, the Defendant's transactions and communications with the
payee of the I nstrument are irro 1 ewtni .

If the Defendanll lias

claims against that party, he is free to raise them. However, they
cannot be raised against an HDC.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is an HDC of this instrument.
allegations

of

notice

given

to

Plaintiff,

The Defendant's
after

Plaintiff

negotiated the i nstr ument in question, are irrelevant
notice which Plaintiff may have had at the time

took the

instrument, which would have any bearing on Plaintiff's status as
an HDC,

As an HDC, Plaintiff can enforce the instrument free of

any defenses the Defendant may have thereto.

However, even if

Plaintiff is merely a holder, Plaintiff is still entitled to
enforce the instrument and is entitled to summary judgment since
the Defendant has raised no defenses to the instrument. Apparently
the Defendant knew he was writing a check 01 :it i nsufficient fi inds.
This does not give rise to a defense to the instrument. If it did,
no

instrument,

drawn

on

insufficient

funds, would

ever

be

enforceable.
Defendant also alleges that his original payee had notice of
this fact prior to the time Plaintiff took the instrument. Notice

00011577.E95
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to the original payee is not notice to Plaintiff, and therefore, it
has no bearing on Plaintiff's right to enforce the instrument.
Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as requested in
Plaintiff's original motion.
DATED this

/ y day of September, 1995.
RICHER/ SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.

B y ;

J a ^ ^ ^

Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

certify

that

on the

/y

day of

September, 1995, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
H. Delbert Welker
Attorney for Defendant
3540 South 4000 West, #430
West Valley City, UT 84120

^Uf//^/Wt/^
00011577.E95
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